Hey,
Came across this article talking abt the RSN program for the naval
helicopters, and thought u guys might want a look. The rest of the
artice can be found at
http://www.maritime-index.com/index.php?pg=129
Article starts:
At the moment the most significant regional naval helicopter
competition is that for the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN), who
are on the verge of entering the naval helicopter business for the
first time. The RSN naval helicopter requirement grew out of a
decision to expand the capabilities of the RSN, through the
acquisition of six frigates. This created a requirement where a
naval helicopter force was essential to conduct Anti-Surface
Warfare (ASuW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and a host of other
missions. However, although the decision to order the six La
Fayette class frigates from DCN International (now Armaris) was
taken in March 2000, progress on equipping them with an organic
helicopter capability has been very slow.
Singapore Starts A Search
Originally the RSN and the Defence Science & Technology Agency
(DSTA) issued a reasonably broad Request for Information (RFI), but
then it became apparent that Singapore had an expanded helicopter
strategy in mind. Instead of a single purchase for the RSN,
Singapore was looking for a combined purchase that would also cover
the helicopter needs of the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF)
and its requirement to replace its existing UH-1H utility
helicopters. Their aim was to limit the number of helicopter types
in Singaporean service and by combining the RSN and RSAF
requirements, achieve better value for money.
The emphasis on the combined requirement would change the shape of
the helicopter competition. Originally, the competition had
attracted a wide range of interested parties including
AgustaWestland offering the Super Lynx Series 300 and the EH101,
Eurocopter offering the Cougar, Kaman offering the SH-2G Super
Seasprite, NH Industries offering the NH 90 and Sikorsky offering
the S-70. The combined helicopter requirement excluded the two
intermediate weight naval helicopters in the form of the Super Lynx
and Super Seasprite from the competition, while issues of deck
strength on the new frigates excluded the larger EH101 from
contention.
Thus whether they intended it or not, the DSTA had already created
a final three for their competition before it had really got
underway! Even so, the fact that DSTA was looking for a single
helicopter type for two very distinct missions added a great deal
of complexity to the evaluation task. As if this were not enough,
as time went on both the DSTA and the RSN became increasingly aware
of the costs of a dedicated naval helicopter. This cost obstacle
had not been anticipated at the start of the evaluation process and
it was to have a continuing impact on the helicopter
programme.
Matters Become Complex
As we reported in a previous issue of Asian Military Review (Issue
2, March/April 2003), the financial issues related to the naval
helicopter have reached a critical point. The Eurocopter Cougar bid
is said to be in the region of $27 million per unit, but it is also
said to be not fully compliant with the RSN requirement, a similar
situation is alleged to be the case with the Sikorsky SH-60R bid,
which has a unit cost of some $38 million per unit. According to
AMR sources, the only fully compliant bid is the NH90NFH, which is
said to have a unit cost of $40 million. AgustaWestland is leading
the NH90 bid for the RSN requirement.
With the only fully compliant bid being in the $320 million region,
the naval helicopter programme is becoming a very expensive
proposition. Added to which, the RSN needs to purchase a missile
for the ASuW mission. Currently the most likely option is, as an
interim, the Kongsberg Penguin Mk2 Mod 7, which has a weight of
350kg and a range of 40 km. In the future another Kongsberg system
in the form of the helicopter-launched version of the Naval Strike
Missile (NSM), which weighs a little over 400 kg and has a range of
over 150 km, seems the most obvious candidate for the RSN. The NSM
is due to become operational in its ship-launched version in 2005.
It is also worth noting that Norway has ordered 14 NH90NFH
helicopters, with options on 10 more as its future ASW
helicopter.
As we can see, by the time you add the procurement costs of the
helicopter and associated weapon systems, plus through life costs,
the acquisition of an advanced naval helicopter is a costly
exercise. Add this to desire of Singapore to standardise on a
single helicopter type for the RSAF as well and it is easy to see
why the DSTA has spent so much time analysing the options and hence
the programme being delayed. Although the NH90 is said to be the
only fully compliant helicopter, the lure of the Sikorsky SH-60
cannot be underestimated. Firstly, U.S. defence links with
Singapore are very strong and the U.S. Navy is reputed to keep a
substantial stock of SH-60 parts in Singapore. Finally, the
Eurocopter bid has support in the RSAF due to commonality with the
existing Super Puma fleet and the long relationship with Eurocopter
products.
The final point to discuss in the RSN helicopter programme is the
fact that the RSN has no naval aviation experience and will
therefore have to develop doctrine from a blank piece of paper. The
RSAF will be providing the aircrew and maintenance support for the
helicopters, both onboard ship and on land. Although the helicopter
decision is still awaited, the task of turning RSN helicopter plans
into operational reality will probably prove the most difficult
task of all.
Article continues
http://www.maritime-index.com/index.php?pg=129
