Arizona Co. with Fleet of A-4 Skyhawks Taps Huge Training
Market
By William B. Scott
August 3, 2003
PHOENIX AIR FORCE
For years, ex-fighter pilots having an entrepreneurial bent have
extolled the benefits allied nations and the Pentagon could realize
by outsourcing tactical pilot training. Private firms could provide
economical "red air" or adversary fighter services, fly cruise and
sea-skimming missile profiles, carry electronic warfare jamming
pods and simulate "enemy" strikers attacking land- and sea-based
targets--all for less money than military forces spend doing these
tasks in-house.
All the startups needed was a fleet of retired U.S. Air Force, Navy
or Marine Corps fighter-bombers, and there were plenty of those
sitting in the Arizona desert--the Pentagon's "boneyard." And
that's where the dreams and good ideas usually hit a wall. The
Pentagon had dozens of valid reasons why high-performance military
aircraft couldn't be transferred to a private company. Yes, a few
retired fighters, trainers and strike aircraft were "bailed" or
leased to companies for specific purposes, such as flight testing,
but these were typically limited-time deals for specific purposes.
All had to be "in the best interests of the U.S. government."
Importing fast-jets from other nations--even if they had originally
come from the U.S. under foreign military sales programs--also
proved problematic. Again, a few companies, such as BAE Systems
(originally Flight Systems Inc.) and the National Test Pilot School
at Mojave, Calif., were allowed to bring a handful of F-86s, T-33s,
Swedish Drakens and other aging fighters and trainers into the
country for well-defined training and flight-testing
purposes.
Most fledgling training-services companies' business plans died
before all the regulatory and licensing hurdles could be jumped.
Typically, their sources of financing lacked the requisite depth,
patience and enthusiasm, and investors were rarely convinced there
was a long-term business case that made fiscal sense.
Despite often-sincere encouragement from USAF and Navy and allied
leaders, when it came down to signing a contract for commercial
high-performance aircraft services, the customer usually backed
down. Budgets were typical culprits. Regardless of reasons given,
someone in the armed services usually decided the best approach was
to continue performing most of the "red air" adversary,
target-towing, missile simulation and other training activities
in-house, using their own aircraft and crews. The rationale was,
"this is flying time for our crews, and we've already paid for them
and the aircraft. We might as well use them rather than pay an
outsider to provide the same services."
But the age of outsourcing advanced tactical training and training
support services may have finally arrived--and with a vengeance.
Downsized force structures, ever-leaner budgets and a profusion of
global commitments have squeezed active-duty and reserve military
air components to exhaustion. Aircrews who were deployed to
Afghanistan, Iraq and other hot spots now return to the U.S. in
need of rest and retraining to ensure they are mission-ready for
yet another deployment. None are too enthused about going to Red
Flag, Maple Flag or some other major exercise to fly as simulated
enemy adversaries or "red air." This applies equally to both
active-duty and reserve crews.
SIMILARLY, AIRCRAFT often return in need of maintenance, and many
have consumed engine and airframe lifetime at rates exceeding what
the services had expected. In other words, both people and aircraft
are wearing out from real-word commitments the U.S. has assumed.
With few exceptions, there simply aren't enough pilots and aircraft
available to deliver the thousands of sorties required for adequate
domestic and allied training anymore.
The 57th Wing at Nellis AFB, Nev., which runs periodic large-force
Red Flag exercises and oversees the USAF Weapons School, has an
estimated annual requirement for 9,125 adversary sorties. Its 414th
Combat Training Sqdn. serves as red-air aggressors, but has been
reduced to a handful of aircraft, and must be augmented by other
units.
A January 2001 Defense Science Board report prepared by the Task
Force on Training Superiority and Training Surprise identified a
number of Air Force and Navy training shortfalls. Addressing the
deterioration of adversary or "opposition force" (Opfor) units at
Nellis and the Navy's Air Warfare Center at Naval Air Station
Fallon, Nev., the report noted:
*In 1989, Nellis had four active-duty aggressor squadrons, each
with 24 dissimilar aircraft (fighters of different types than
"blue-air" or friendly aircraft). By December 1999, Nellis' stable
of aggressors had shrunk to 8-10 dedicated F-16s, "all old and
unreliable," the report said.
*Navy-Fallon went from four active-duty adversary squadrons, each
with more than 20 dissimilar aircraft, in 1994 to "23 old
dissimilar aircraft" limited to 3-g maneuvers and flown by Reserve
pilots, plus 15 flyable F-18s and five F-14s in 1999.
*Both of these combat training centers can only field "antiquated
EW [electronic warfare] for the Opfor" and have "limited
maintenance and support budgets."
*"The 1999 cost to upgrade NAS Fallon EW and provide 18 dissimilar
Opfor aircraft (F-16s) [is approximately] $940 million."
The report noted: "The Air Force decided years ago to forgo a
substantial dedicated air opposing force (aggressor squadrons).
'Red' aircraft in [USAF] Red Flag Exercises are now manned mostly
by active-duty pilots who, with their aircraft, are borrowed from
other squadrons. These pilots receive negative training for the
time spent trying to imitate enemy tactics. Moreover, the aircraft
used are not 'dissimilar.' . . . This seriously degrades the
training experience.
" . . . A key element missing from even the most-demanding training
programs . . . is the notion of a dedicated opposing force that
provides realistic simulation of enemy action," the report
concluded.
Several commercial firms are offering to fill this widening gap
between military training requirements and the Pentagon's ability
to provide it. Others have tried and largely failed in the past, to
be sure. But the business environment may be substantially
different this time. Now, even big-name aerospace company
executives believe the U.S. and allied military forces are in a
position where they will accept--and pay for--outside training
support services, and are jockeying to grab a portion of what may
become billion-dollar contracts.
THREE YEARS AGO, a U.S. Navy vice admiral told Larry (Hoss)
Pearson--a former U.S. Navy Blue Angels flight demonstration team
commander, combat veteran and test pilot--"You should get into
foreign military pilot training, because the Navy is getting out of
it. With the downsizing, we're not going to be able to continue
doing it." Pearson is now chairman and CEO of Advanced Training
Systems International (ATSI) Inc., based here at the former
Williams AFB, now called Williams Gateway Airport.
At that time, the Navy was facing a $10-billion budget cut over
five years; $5 billion was to be absorbed by naval aviation.
Immediately, three electronic-warfare training squadrons that
provided jamming services for surface ships were disbanded--50
aircraft and about 500 people, Pearson estimated. Since then, the
number of worldwide adversary units have been cut severely, and
Navy-provided slots for training Kuwaiti, Saudi Arabian, Spanish,
Italian and other foreign pilots also have all but
disappeared.
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