http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3051916.stm
Iraq weapons: would a jury convict?
Analysis
by Paul Reynolds
BBC News Online world affairs correspondent
The jury may still be out on the question of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction, but on the evidence produced so far it is unlikely
that a jury would convict.
Critics of the US and British Governments believe that, like the
Cheshire cat in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, the case that
Iraq did have such weapons is vanishing
If nothing substantial is found, not only will more questions be
asked about the use governments made of intelligence, but issues
will arise about the value of that intelligence itself.
The reputations of key agencies like the CIA and Britain's Joint
Intelligence Committee are at stake, with implications for their
assessments in future crises.
UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw is standing by the decision to go
to war not only "on the basis of evidence then available" but "on
the basis of what we know now".
Shifting their ground
However, it is interesting to note that even those who early on
accepted that there was evidence against Iraq are subtly shifting
their ground.
Dr John Chipman, Director of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, has told the BBC: "I think
there will be increasing evidence found of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction programme."
Note the word "programme." It implies an aim, perhaps a capability,
but not necessarily the possession of these weapons.
Back in September, when the IISS issued its own influential report
on Iraq just ahead of similar ones from the British Government and
the CIA, its assessment was more definite. The word "arsenal" was
used:
"This Strategic Dossier does not attempt to make a case, either
way, as to whether Saddam Hussein's WMD arsenal is a casus belli
per se."
Evidence of intention
The current aim of the US and British Governments is not so much to
find actual Iraqi weapons but evidence of Iraqi intentions. They
have a team of experts, known as the Iraq Survey Group, roaming the
country and questioning scientists.
Reliable indications that Iraq intended to defy the UN and secretly
develop chemical or biological weapons, even if on a relatively
small scale, would go a long way to justifying their
position.
Two recent finds have been brought to the jury's attention. The
first is the discovery of a truck which was seized by Kurdish
forces near Mosul in late April. The CIA website declares
unambiguously that this truck (and other vehicles found elsewhere
in Iraq) constitute "Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent
Production Plants".
However, there are sceptics. The New York Times concluded in an
editorial: "It is difficult to know for sure whether these mobile
units were part of a program to produce unconventional weapons or
served a more benign purpose."
Then more recently, it was announced that an Iraq scientist had led
US forces to his rose garden under which he had buried a barrel
containing the blueprints of a centrifuge for separating enriched
uranium.
He had, he said, been ordered to do this after the first Gulf War
of 1991. The implication is that the Iraqi Government was trying to
maintain an ability to enrich uranium, without which it could not
build a nuclear bomb.
The question that arises, however, is whether this was an old plan
or an active one. If active, it would be highly significant.
Inspector's doubts
For some, the failure to find any weapons is pretty conclusive
already. A former UN weapons inspector, Steve Allinson, a British
trained chemical engineer now living in New Zealand, told the BBC
that he felt "vindicated" in doubting that Iraq had any weapons of
mass destruction.
He said that when he returned to Iraq during the searches earlier
this year, places he had inspected on previous visits "had hardly
changed, except that their infrastructure had degraded". He was
"not very surprised" that nothing definite had been found so
far.
Several key allegations have been found to be either unfounded or
lacking substance. Chemical and biological material unaccounted for
has not been discovered in weapons form. It is still simply
unaccounted for.
A British claim, later repeated by President George W Bush, that
Iraq had tried to buy uranium from an African country (Niger) was
not supported either by the International Atomic Energy Agency or
by a former American diplomat, Joseph Wilson, who was told to look
into it.
Mr Wilson concluded that it was "highly doubtful" that a
transaction had taken place. He further concluded, in an interview
with NBC, that "some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear
weapons programme was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi
threat".
These remarks are among the strongest made by a domestic critic
about the Bush administration which has been relatively insulated
from criticism.
Nothing has been found to back up the British Government's claim
that Iraq was ready to deploy some weapons within 45 minutes. Nor
have any Scud missiles been discovered, despite claims that Iraq
had up to twenty of them.
The case for the prosecution will not be complete until the task of
the Iraq Survey group has been finished.
Dr Chipman suggested that it might take 18 months to two years for
them to conclude their investigations