From -
http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/commentary/story/0,4386,179612,00.html?
Fighting terrorism: SAF's secret edge
DAVID BOEY
THE hijacking of Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight SQ 117 by four
Pakistanis was resolved by Special Operations Force (SOF) commandos
12 years ago today.
At the time of the crisis, few people could have imagined how
airliner hijacks would one day take on the more deadly form of
suicide attacks, and spur defence planners the world over to devise
extensive measures against these threats.
In the post-911 era, defence planners grapple with twin challenges.
One is to minimise the loss of life of passengers and aircrew. The
other is to devise policies and procedures to ensure terrorist
pilots cannot turn compromised airliners into guided
missiles.
Decisive force is a last line of defence. Preventive measures are
equally important and this explains why Singapore has tightened
airport security and introduced air marshals on selected flights.
Alongside these efforts is ongoing work done by the intelligence
services to find and root out terrorist elements.
It does not take a great intellect to sense the sort of ethical
issues security planners must deal with when contemplating decisive
force to resolve copycat 911-style strikes.
Before anti-terrorist teams are deployed, the executive group of
key civil servants tasked to handle the crisis work through
multiple scenarios that could complicate its speedy
resolution.
Threat scenarios differ according to whether the compromised
aircraft belongs to a Singapore carrier or a foreign one. Under
international law, other things being equal, an airline falls under
the jurisdiction of its flag. There is also a big difference
between the hijack occurring on the ground of the home country, in
international air space, or at a foreign airport.
While the Defence Ministry has been coy about discussing its
counter-terrorist options, the SQ 117 hijack crisis 12 years ago
provides telling indicators of how Singapore might respond to such
incidents.
FACE-OFF WITH TERROR
THE SIA Airbus A310 was hijacked on March 26, 1991, en route from
Kuala Lumpur to Singapore. It was later learnt that the foursome
were armed with nothing more dangerous than fireworks and inflight
cutlery.
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) commandos stormed the Airbus at 6.50
am on March 27. The operation was over in 30 seconds and 123
passengers and crew were freed. All four terrorists were killed by
gunfire.
Twelve years ago, Singaporeans at large were not prepared for the
gravity of the SQ 117 situation. For instance, when word of the
crisis first broke, some thought it was a hoax. And after the
incident was resolved, there were comments on whether the
knife-wielding terrorists could have been subdued peacefully.
The operation was unique on two accounts. First, it marked the
first time Singapore had resolved an airliner hijacking through
force of arms. Second, it was the first time that an SAF unit had
been sent on operations even before its existence had been
officially acknowledged.
The commando unit that stormed SQ 117 was the SOF. This unit was
formed secretly in 1984 and has trained with crack foreign
anti-terrorist teams from the British Special Air Service, German
GSG-9 and various American hostage rescue teams.
Mindef/SAF did not take the wraps off the SOF even after the
black-clad commandos were photographed storming the SIA plane. It
consistently referred to them as having come from Headquarters
Commando. Mindef only acknowledged the SOF's existence on Feb 20,
1997. This was 13 years after they were formed and six years after
they first went into action.
The unveiling this January of the SAF's Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Explosives (CBRE) Defence Group shows that Mindef
has not changed its practice of keeping secret various special
capabilities in the SAF's arsenal.
The sudden emergence of the CBRE group reflects the proactive
stance taken by defence planners here in ensuring a well-balanced
force structure for the SAF.
As Singapore guards against catastrophic terrorism, it's reasonable
to assume that there are other aspects in the SAF's order of battle
Mindef is not ready to talk about. These special weapons and elite
units will be tasked with delivering Mindef's 'swift and decisive'
response should deterrence and diplomacy fail.
FIRST THREAT
TO UNDERSTAND the challenges that airplane hijacks pose to security
planners, consider this scenario: Singapore authorities are told
that an airliner has been hijacked en route to Paya Lebar Airport.
To complicate matters, the commercial flight is a foreign aircraft
that took off from a regional country.
The airliner flies a steady course for Singapore and is due to
arrive in local air space in about eight hours. As there's no
practical way of forcing a hijacked aircraft to land, should
decisive force be used against this flight?
Lest you think this is a far-fetched scenario, it should be
mentioned that authorities here faced just such an incident more
than 30 years ago.
The day was Sept 27, 1972. A flight engineer aboard a Boeing 707
operated by Greek airline Olympic Airways accidentally flipped a
'hijack alarm'. The plane, Flight 472, took off from Sydney bound
for Paya Lebar Airport with 31 passengers and 11 crew at 10.30 am,
Singapore time.
Authorities here were not informed of the situation till four hours
later. Following a flurry of conflicting reports, Australia's
Department of Civil Aviation warned Singapore's airport 'to be
ready for a possible hijacking'.
Flight 472 landed at Paya Lebar at 6:25 pm and was immediately
ringed by police. But after the plane touched down, there was no
indication a hijacking was in progress. A Straits Times report said
the control tower at Paya Lebar was asked by Flight 472's baffled
pilots 'to send the gangway and a bus to pick up the passengers'.
So, Singapore's first hijack drama turned out to be a false
alarm.
The young Republic was lucky it was a false alarm as the absence of
hostage-rescue commandos and civil defence measures would have
severely crimped its policy options.
Faced with a similar situation today, Singapore's authorities have
a ready range of arms and procedures to deal with aircraft
hijackers. One should appreciate the thought processes that have
gone into drawing up these defences - and hope that the secret-edge
capabilities the SAF has in its arsenal are never used.
The writer is a correspondent with the Business Times. He
contributed this article toThe Straits Times.
