Originally posted by APV97MCV91:
hello 05
I stand corrected on the issue of the independent sailing by fast
merchant ships 
. I do not understand your sentence
[b]If the U Boats had longer range, they could be convoy raiders
like the Bismarck I thought the U Boats were already
convoy raiders? As for the issue of using them in the Med, I think
that would be an unwise tactical decision. Why would you want to
divert your forces from the main theatre of operation - The
Atlantic? Between the India - Britain convoys and the US-Britain
convoys, I think the value of the latter would be much greater than
the former. Moreover, only a few of the German U Boats diverted to
the Med were able to emerge safely from the Med - The transit of
the Straits of Gibraltar was especially hazardous. The U Boats
diverted to the Med were hence effectively locked in the Med. I
grant you the fact that the ASW conditions in the Med were terrible
- High acoustic background and poor sound transmission etc. The
British submarines based in Malta and Gibraltar did have an
excellent campaign though but there was no requirement for them to
be in the Atlantic. Using the U Boats to take out the Home Fleet
would have been a misapplication of resources. As attractive as
idea of taking out combatants were, the Atlantic Campaign was
ultimately about the economic strangulation of Britain and hence
taking out a tanker would be much better than taking out a cruiser.
The risks were greater and the possible returns lower. To support
my argument on this, I would point to the case of the Japanese
submarine policy. The I Boats were designed with fleet action in
mind and they were not unleashed on an organised commerce hunting
campaign. The returns of the I Boats on warships were rather
mediocre but at because of this decision, the Allies convoy in the
Pacific were pretty much unmolested to the extent that by 1944, the
Allies merchant vessels were travelling the Pacific unescorted and
unconvoyed. I have 2 major critique of the U Boats operation. The
1st one was the inflexibility of the command and control system.
Upon sighting of the convoy, direction of the convoy battle were
shifted to U Boat HQ in Kerneval. The rationale was that the HQ
would have a more holistic picture and hence better able to direct
their operations to maximise impact. The downside of this was that
the HQ have no inkling of the actual tactical conditions and the
commanders were not free to pursue better options. Coordinating the
wolf packs also generated large amount of signal traffic and with
the advent of shipboard HFDF and the breaking of Engima, it allowed
for the tracking of the U Boats and contributed to their
destruction. A better model of tactical control would be the
American method whereby the subs operated in packs of 3 or 4 with a
local senior commander in full tactical control and minimal HQ
interference. The 2nd main criticism was the very poor interservice
cooperation between the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. Insignificant
aircraft were allocated to the U Boat campaign and even these were
allocated grudgingly. Coordination of the air support and U Boat
operation was minimal as well. This deprived the U Boats of
intelligence and tactical support.
[/b]
hmm.......makes sense...though the uboats could and were
transported via rail to italy.But by sinking convoys in the med and
with longer ranger the U-boats to seige the African coast,and the
suez and maybe even Gilbratar they could have prevented troops from
going into Africa and maybe win that place thus preventing the need
for Stalingrad and the cacause(sic) fields.And to expand on ur
Luftwaffe and uboat's poor interservice well the Germans did lack a
long range bomber.heck they could hardly hit targets in
Britian!.Basically i believe the Germans screwed their chances with
a few key mistakes.
