Chamberlain's policy of appeasement was also acted in
Britain's best interest .
He felt that by instigating a war between Germany and Russia,
the problems of europe could be solved.
Of these three points, the first two were shared with the
Chamberlain group; the third was not. The difference rested on the
fact that the Chamberlain group hoped to permit Britain to escape
from the necessity of fighting Germany by getting Russia to fight
Germany.
The Chamberlain group did not share the Milner Group’s naive
belief in the possibility of three great power blocs standing side
by side in peace. Lacking that belief, they
preferred a German-Russian war to a British-German
war.
And, having that preference, they differed from the Milner Group
in their willingness to accept the partition of Poland by
Germany.
The Milner Group would have yielded parts of Poland to Germany
if done by fair negotiation.
The Chamberlain group was
quite prepared to liquidate Poland entirely,
if it could be presented to the British people in terms which they
would accept without demanding war...
http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/
Severely weakened by the Great Depression and in no position to
make military threats, Chamberlain and Daladier
hoped to push Hitler's ambitions eastward. The one unifying belief
all four leaders shared was their fanatical hatred of the Soviet
Union and anything remotely related to International
Communism.
A strong and well-armed Nazi regime in Central Europe, they
believed, was a necessary buffer to Soviet power. And with their
own domestic economic crises and their labor unions going
communist, France and England focused their attention not on the
threat of fascism but on the growing influence of the Soviet Union.
(Their positions on the Spanish Civil War bear this fact
out.)
France and England hoped Germany would spark a shooting war with
the Soviet Union and then they could sit back and watch the
fascists and communists tear each other apart. It didn't work out
that way...
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-a-palermo/george
A key factor
in Britain and France's attitude towards Hitler was a desire to
steer his ambitions eastwards and into war with Russia. In that
way, it was hoped, the two perils could eliminate each
other.
Stanley Baldwin, who preceded Chamberlain, was fairly frank. In
1936, he told Tory MPs alarmed about Hitler, that it would not
'break his heart' if the tensions in Europe led to 'the Nazis
fighting the Bolshies'.
The diaries of Foreign Office chief Sir Alexander Cadogan, shine a
light on Chamberlain's outlook.
The Russians had been calling for a strong stand against Hitler on
every occasion he pushed forward his military ambitions
- reintroducing conscription, occupying the Rhineland,
annexing Austria and threatening Czechoslovakia.
On every occasion, the despairing Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim
Litvinov got the brush off from London on the grounds either that
Soviet offers of aid were insincere or impractical.
Nevertheless the British chiefs of staff eventually came round to
favouring what Cadogan called a 'whole hog alliance with
Russia'.
He added, significantly, that the idea 'annoyed' Chamberlain.
Cadogan himself was hostile to such an alliance, as was most of the
establishment, constantly scared by the Communist bogey despite the
party winning only one seat in 1935.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1066952/
Churchill was chosen, above all, because the chief aim of Round
Table policy was the clash between Russia and Germany. That, in order to draw the
United States into the war their geopolitics had brought
about.
Chamberlain's role in setting
Germany against Russia had exhausted its usefulness, once the
secret German-Soviet Friendship Treaty had been
signed.
A new ploy, other than playing up to Hitler through appeasement,
was now required to advance the game. That ploy was called Winston
Churchill.
For years Churchill had carefully cultivated the attentions of
Moscow, as Britain's most vocal opponent of appeasing Germany,
through, among others, London ambassador Ivan Maisky. Maisky
apparently never quite realized how he and Moscow were merely being
maneuvered by the sly Churchill, to lead the Soviet Union into
a bloodbath with Germany, in pursuit of British geopolitical
strategy.
Chamberlain had merely
represented another way to accomplish the same bloody goal, a
German-Soviet war, by playing to the German side against the Soviet
Union.
http://www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net/History/
British policy had only one
aim: to cajole, wheedle, guide and direct Germany against Soviet
Russia.
http://www.columbia.edu/~lnp3/mark_jones/appeasement.htm
At the same time, Stalin spoke with great insight to
Zhukov:
`The French Government headed by Daladier and the
Chamberlain Government in Britain have no intention of
getting seriously involved in the war with Hitler.
They
still hope to incite Hitler to a war against the Soviet
Union. By refusing in 1939 to form with us an
anti-Hitler bloc, they did not want to hamper Hitler in
his aggression against the Soviet Union. Nothing will come of it.
They will have to pay through the nose for their short-sighted
policy.'
Stalin understood perfectly that France and Britain
were preparing a new Munich, that they were ready to sacrifice
Poland, encouraging Hitler
to march on the Soviet Union. Harold Ickes, U.S. Secretary of the Interior,
wrote at the time in his journal:
`(England)
kept hoping against hope that she could embroil Russia and Germany
with each other and thus escape scot-free
herself.'
http://www.plp.org/books/Stalin/node131.htm