It's about annexation, stupid!
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Officially, Israel's ground invasion of Lebanon is an act of
self-defense against Hezbollah's threat, aimed at creating a
security buffer zone until the arrival of a "multinational force
with an enforcement capability". But increasingly, as the initial
goal of a narrow strip of only a few kilometers has now been
extended up to the Litani River deep in Lebanon, the real motives
behind Israel's invasion are becoming crystal-clear.
It's about (de facto) annexation, stupid. This is a war to annex a
major chunk of Lebanese territory without necessarily saying so,
under the pretext of security buffer and deterrence against future
attacks on Israel.
Already, since the Six Day War, Israel has annexed the Sheba Farms,
considered part of the Syrian Golan Heights, although the
government of Lebanon has long complained that the
25-square-kilometer area was a part of Lebanon. Now the Israeli
army is sweeping the area south of the Litani River as a temporary
occupation.
"We have no intention of extending our operation more than 70
kilometers north of our borders with Lebanon," stated
Lieutenant-Colonel Hemi Lini on the Lebanese border on July 17, one
week after the war's outbreak.
This would put Israel, assuming for a moment that the Israel
Defense Forces' operations prove ultimately successful, in control
of the Litani River, thus fulfilling Israel's founding fathers'
dream, stretching back to Chaim Weizmann, head of the World Zionist
Organization, who in 1919 declared the river "essential to the
future of the Jewish national home".
Consequently, contrary to the pro-Israel pundits' reassurances that
this war is not about occupation, all the tangible signs indicate
the exact opposite, ie, the distinct possibility of a "war of
acreage" whereby Israel would expand its territory, acquire a new
strategic depth, and simultaneously address its chronic water
shortage by exploiting the Litani.
Access to the Litani would translate into an annual increase of
water supply by 800 million cubic meters. This in turn might allow
Israel to bargain with Syria over the Golan Heights, source of a
full one-third of Israel's fresh water. However, a more likely
scenario is Israel's continued unwillingness to abide by United
Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 calling for its withdrawal from the
Syrian territories.
The entire Western media have settled on a naive perspective of the
reasons for Israel's invasion of Lebanon, namely as a defensive
measure against Hezbollah. Conspicuously absent is any serious
consideration of a viable, alternative explanation while focusing
on, in essence, the same ingredients as in the 1982 invasion:
"deceit and misleading statements" by leaders, "inaccurate
announcements" by the military spokesmen, and "gross exaggeration"
of threats, to paraphrase a candid reflection of an Israeli
general, Yehoshafat Harkabi.
Following this scenario, Israel has dropped leaflets throughout
southern Lebanon warning the civilians to leave or risk their
lives, as they would be considered "Hezbollah sympathizers" if they
refused to leave. Reminiscent of Israel's annexation of Palestinian
lands in 1948 and beyond, the present war is causing mass refugees,
who in all likelihood will not return to their homes any time
soon.
The geostrategic and water dimensions of Israel's quest to possess
southern Lebanon notwithstanding, the question is, of course,
whether or not the world community will tolerate such a development
that would remake the map of the Middle East.
There are plenty of reasons to think that in light of the United
States' complicit silence on Israel's violation of the territorial
integrity of Lebanon, Israel will somehow manage to ride out the
international criticisms and stick to its undeclared plan to annex
southern Lebanon. However, what is less certain is that the
combined efforts of Hezbollah and the rest of Lebanese society, not
to mention other Arab contributions, will prevail over Israel's
appetite for a decent part of Lebanon.
With the military balance disproportionately in Israel's favor, we
can safely assume that the new Operation Litani will succeed and
thus create a "new Middle East" with a "greater" and geographically
expanded Israel and a shrunken or diminished Lebanon.
If so, then the chronology of events narrated by future historians
will closely follow this line of thought: that Israel deliberately
provoked Hezbollah into action, after a six-year hiatus, by
pressuring Hezbollah's ally, Hamas, which was subjected to a
campaign of terror, financial squeeze and intimidation.
The laying of such a trap by Israel would not have happened in a
vacuum of strategic thinking on Israel's part. The fact that
Hezbollah fell into the trap is a result of several factors,
including an adventurist element lending itself to the "reckless"
action of Hezbollah on July 11 with respect to crossing the Blue
Line and attacking an Israeli patrol.
Since then, the Israelis have put on the mask of being reluctant
warriors, delaying their troops' entry into south Lebanon and thus
perpetuating Israel's self-image as disinterested in any imperial
grand objectives. Yet the facts on the ground speak louder than
words and, indeed, what fact is more important than Israeli
leaders' announced intention to occupy up to the Litani
River?
Again, what is understandably omitted in those announcements,
adopted as the real reasons by CNN and other US networks, is
Israel's predatory lust after Litani's water sources, as well as
for new geographical and strategic depth. This in turn might
explain the otherwise inexplicably blatant overreaction of Israel
to a border incident with Hezbollah.
Instead of searching for answers in the Israeli collective psyche
or in the context of action, we must probe the answer in the
writings of Israel's founding fathers, including Theodor Herzl and
David Ben-Gurion, commonly yearning for Israel's control of the
Litani River. As a timely addition to their old wish, Israel today
has a security-related explanation, justifying the territorial
takeover in the near future in terms of the lessons of the present
war, the main lesson being Israel's dire need to gain strategic
depth to avoid rocket attacks.
Indeed, the verdict will soon be out in Israel about the precious
lesson of Lebanon War II, that is, how to prevent future rocket
attacks in the only feasible way, that is, direct control of
southern Lebanon.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HH05Ak01.html
