Korea: The Complications of U.S. Force Restructuring
Apr 11, 2003
Stratfor Intelligence
Summary
South Korea and the United States have begun discussing the
"realignment" of U.S. forces in Korea, with talks set to last until
October. Given the complicated nature of the issue, the talks will
cause strains between Washington and Seoul and within each nation.
At stake is more than the question of providing a deterrent force
to prevent North Korean adventurism, but the very shape of
Northeast Asian security and political relations.
Analysis
South Korean and U.S. officials met April 8 and 9 for the first in
a planned series of discussions on the realignment of U.S. Forces
in Korea (USFK). The "Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy
Initiative" meeting, convened at South Korea's Ministry of Defense
in Seoul, was led by Assistant Defense Minister for Policy Lt. Gen.
Cha Young Koo and U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
East Asia and the Pacific Richard Lawless. Among other things, the
two sides agreed to move the U.S. Yongsan Garrison out of downtown
Seoul as soon as possible and to strengthen the defense role of
South Korea's armed forces.
Despite the public agreements, the talks have been anything but
smooth, since they ultimately will redefine the 50-year alliance
between South Korea and the United States. The talks undoubtedly
will strain ties between and within the two nations as they seek to
balance nationalism, political priorities and defense necessities.
In the end, it is more than the disposition of U.S. forces that is
being decided, but the very shape of the Northeast Asian political
and security spheres.
Talk of reorganizing the USFK has been going on for years,
particularly after the fall of the Soviet Union, which brought
about the end of the Cold War. The size and composition of U.S.
forces in both Korea and Japan was justified to a large degree by
the Cold War imperative of having a forward base of operations in
the Pacific theater -- keeping troops on the Soviet back doorstep,
so to speak. The USFK also served the dual purpose of discouraging
another North Korean invasion of the South and being ready should
hostilities between the two Koreas actually erupt.
But growing Korean nationalism and the June 2000 inter-Korean
summit accelerated calls from within South Korea to reshape the
USFK, while in Washington there were discussions on reshaping much
of the U.S. military to more effectively cope with changing global
security imperatives -- something made all the more pressing by the
Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in Washington and New York. The "Future of
the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative" talks are now seeking to
make these changes a reality.
Within South Korea, there are many seemingly contradictory thoughts
concerning U.S. forces. The USFK presence is seen as both deterring
North Korea from striking out at South Korea and as interfering
with the inter-Korean peace and reconciliation process.
The presence of the Yongsan base in Seoul gives an impression of an
occupying foreign force in the capital -- something intensified by
the agreement for U.S. forces to take command of South Korean
forces in wartime. But the presence of U.S. forces in the capital
and to the north, near the DMZ, also reassures the financial
community that the United States is truly committed to preserving
South Korea's security, thus negating much of the economic impact
of having a heavily armed North Korea training its artillery on
Seoul.
From the U.S. point of view, the forces deployed on the peninsula
serve not only as a deterrent for North Korea, but also provide a
frontline deterrent for China. At the same time, with the end of
the Cold war, the 36,000 troops there are effectively held hostage
-- since they are structured in such a way that they cannot leave
Korea for other regional or global contingencies. With Washington
seeking to establish a new force structure in Asia -- one that no
longer relies on massive pre-positioned forces but rather on highly
mobile and flexible forces with access to facilities in several
different countries on short notice -- the USFK, and even the
forces in Japan, are becoming an anomaly.
Both sides agree there is a need to redefine the U.S.-South Korean
alliance and the structure of U.S. forces in Korea, but an
agreement on just what that reshaping will look like is not easily
achieved.
The key issues for South Korea include the Yongsan base in Seoul,
the U.S. command of South Korean troops during a time of war, South
Korean defense capabilities and continued U.S. commitment to the
nation's defense.
Seoul supports the movement of the Yongsan base out of the capital,
since this would both free up valuable land and remove the
political impression of the USFK as an occupying force -- something
that grates on Korean sensibilities. And Washington already has
agreed to move the base as soon as feasible, most likely to Osan.
U.S. soldiers will no doubt feel a sense of relief leaving the
outdated command at Yongsan, one of the least desired posts for
U.S. servicemen.
More complicated, however, is Washington's plan to withdraw all
U.S. forces to south of the Han River. The USFK currently has
several bases north of the river, making up the so-called
"tripwire," a phrase disliked by the U.S. military. From a South
Korean perspective, these forces guarantee U.S. support should
hostilities break out with North Korea, since American troops would
be among the first to take fire. Their withdrawal south of the Han
would take them out of range of much of North Korea's frontline
artillery, preserving a greater number of U.S. forces for a
counterstrike into North Korea if a war breaks out.
But South Korean politicians also are concerned that if U.S. forces
pull back, Washington would have a freer hand in dealings with
Pyongyang -- allowing it to gamble with the lives of South Koreans
should the U.S. negotiation strategy or pressure tactics go bad.
Complicating matters, however, is an underlying hope that if U.S.
forces did pull back from the front lines, South Korea might be
able to negotiate a similar pullback of North Korean forces,
reducing the tensions along the border and paving the way for
further reconciliation efforts.
Perhaps the most difficult of issues, however, will be the
restructuring of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), which gives
operational control of the South Korean military to the commanding
U.S. general in time of war. Washington has maintained this
structure to ensure coordinated control in the event of another
Korean War, but also to prevent South Korea from launching its own
attack on North Korea. But Seoul increasingly views this structure
a violation of its own sovereignty and a hindrance to the
development of a truly independent South Korean state.
Neither side sees much room for compromise on this issue at this
time. Washington can keep strong influence and control over Seoul's
North Korea policy as long as Washington holds the command elements
of the South Korean armed forces -- control that Washington views
as a positive but which is seen in an increasingly dim light by
Seoul. Further, some political and military planners in both Seoul
and Washington see the CFC as a deterrent for North Korea, in that
Pyongyang knows that any skirmish -- even with only a few South
Korean troops -- could quickly escalate into a full war with the
United States. By retaining the CFC structure, North Korea cannot
pick away at the unity of the alliance.
But beyond the political and security debates in Korea, the
reshaping of the USFK could profoundly affect the regional balance
of power. The United States has little intention of reducing its
air assets in South Korea, but it does want to free these up for
broader regional duty. And the ground forces, smaller in number but
increasingly mobile, could retain their deterrent and early
reaction capabilities while also proving useful for deployments
elsewhere in Asia. Meanwhile, any shift in the USFK structure
likely will trigger a clamor in Japan for a reassessment of U.S.
forces there as well.
Washington and Seoul have set an October deadline to prepare a
draft plan for the realignment of the USFK, making the next six
months a critical time for relations between the two nations and
for the new South Korean government, which must preserve the
nation's security and shape the future of relations with the United
States while protecting its own interests and pride.
Whatever decisions emerge from the talks, the effects will be felt
far beyond the Korean peninsula.