Everyone says that Japan, Germany and Italy were at fault and
they were the ones who caused world war 2 and demanded that they
apologise.
Britain was also at fault because it was they who encouraged
Hitler to expand eastwards and then go attack Russia.
France tried to encircle Germany but Britain blocked her efforts
to do so as Britain's agenda was to let Germany go east.
But don't expect english textbooks or historians to tell you
this.
...Any analysis of the motivations of Britain in 1938-1939 is
bound to be difficult because different people had different
motives, motives changed in the course of time, the motives of the
government were clearly not the same as the motives of the people,
and in no country has secrecy and anonymity been carried so far or
been so well preserved as in Britain. In general, motives become
vaguer and less secret as we move our attention from the innermost
circles of the government outward. As if we were looking at the
layers of an onion, we may discern four points of view: (1) the
anti-Bolsheviks at the center, (2) the "three-bloc-world"
supporters close to the center, (3) the supporters of
"appeasement," and (4) the "peace at any price" group in a
peripheral position. The "anti-Bolsheviks," who
were also anti-French, were extremely important from 1919 to 1926,
but then decreased to little more than a lunatic fringe, rising
again in numbers and influence after 1934 to dominate the real
policy of the government in 1939. In the earlier period the chief
figures in this group were Lord Curzon, Lord D'Abernon, and General
Smuts. They did what they could to destroy reparations, permit
German rearmament, and tear down what they called "French
militarism."
This point of view was supported by the
second group, which was known in those days as the Round Table
Group, and came later to be called, somewhat inaccurately, the
Cliveden Set, after the country estate of Lord and Lady Astor. It
included Lord Milner, Leopold Amery, and Edward Grigg (Lord
Altrincham), as well as Lord Lothian, Smuts, Lord Astor, Lord Brand
(brother-in-law of Lady Astor and managing director of Lazard
Brothers, the international bankers), Lionel Curtis, Geoffrey
Dawson (editor of The Times), and their associates. This group
wielded great influence because it controlled the Rhodes Trust, the
Beit Trust, The Times of London, The Observer, the influential and
highly anonymous quarterly review known as The Round Table (founded
in 1910 with money supplied by Sir Abe Bailey and the Rhodes Trust,
and with Lothian as editor), and it dominated the Royal Institute
of International Affairs, called "Chatham House" (of which Sir Abe
Bailey and the Astors were the chief financial supporters, while
Lionel Curtis was the actual founder), the Carnegie United Kingdom
Trust, and All Souls College, Oxford. This Round Table Group formed
the core of the three-bloc-world supporters, and differed from the
anti-Bolsheviks like D'Abernon in that they sought to contain the
Soviet Union between a German-dominated Europe and an
English-speaking bloc rather than to destroy it as the
anti-Bolsheviks wanted. Relationships between the two groups were
very close and friendly, and some people, like Smuts, were in
both.
The anti-Bolsheviks,
including D'Abernon, Smuts, Sir John Simon, and H. A. L. Fisher
(Warden of All Souls College), were willing to go to any extreme to
tear down France and build up Germany. Their
point of view can be found in many places, and most emphatically in
a letter of August 11, 1920, from D'Abernon to Sir Maurice (later
Lord) Hankey, a prot้g้ of Lord Esher who wielded great influence
in the inter-war period as secretary to the Cabinet and secretary
to almost every international conference on reparations from Genoa
(1922) to Lausanne (1932). D'Abernon advocated a secret alliance of
Britain "with the German military leaders in cooperating against
the Soviet." As ambassador of Great Britain in Berlin in 1920-1926,
D'Abernon carried on this policy and blocked all efforts by the
Disarmament Commission to disarm, or even inspect, Germany
(according to Brigadier J. H. Morgan of the commission).
The point of view of this group was
presented by General Smuts in a speech of October 23, 1923 (made
after luncheon with H. A. L. Fisher). From these two groups came
the Dawes Plan and the Locarno pacts. It was Smuts, according to
Stresemann, who first suggested the Locarno policy, and it was
D'Abernon who became its chief supporter. H. A. L. Fisher and John
Simon in the House of Commons, and Lothian, Dawson, and their
friends on The Round Table and on The Times prepared the ground
among the British governing class for both the Dawes Plan and
Locarno as early as 1923 (The Round Table for March 1923; the
speeches of Fisher and Simon in the House of Commons on February
19, 1923, Fisher's speech of March 6th and Simon's speech of March
13th in the same place, The Round Table for June 1923; and Smuts's
speech of October 23rd).
The more moderate Round Table group,
including Lionel Curtis, Leopold Amery (who was the shadow of Lord
Milner), Lord Lothian, Lord Brand, and Lord Astor, sought to weaken
the League of Nations and destroy all possibility of collective
security in order to strengthen Germany in respect to both France
and the Soviet Union, and above all to free Britain from Europe in
order to build up an "Atlantic bloc" of Great Britain, the British
Dominions, and the United States. They prepared the way for this
"Union" through the Rhodes Scholarship organization (of which Lord
Milner was the head in 1905-1925 and Lord Lothian was secretary in
1925-1940), through the Round Table groups (which had been set up
in the United States, India, and the British Dominions in T 910-
1917), through the Chatham House organization, which set up Royal
Institutes of International Affairs in all the dominions and a
Council on Foreign Relations in New York, as well as through
"Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences" held irregularly,
and the Institutes of Pacific Relations set up in various countries
as autonomous branches of the Royal Institutes of International
Affairs. This influential group sought to change the League of
Nations from an instrument of collective security to an
international conference center for "nonpolitical" matters like
drug control or international postal services, to rebuild Germany
as a buffer against the Soviet Union and a counterpoise to France,
and to build up an Atlantic bloc of Britain, the Dominions, the
United States, and, if possible, the Scandinavian countries.
One of the effusions of this group was the
project called Union Now, and later Union Now with Great Britain,
propagated in the United States in 1938-1945 by Clarence Streit on
behalf of Lord Lothian and the Rhodes Trust. Ultimately, the inner
circle of this group arrived at the idea of the "three-bloc world."
It was believed that this system could force Germany to keep the
peace (after it absorbed Europe) because it would be squeezed
between the Atlantic bloc and the Soviet Union, while the Soviet
Union could be forced to keep the peace because it would be
squeezed between Japan and Germany. This plan would work only if
Germany and the Soviet Union could be brought into contact with
each other by abandoning to Germany Austria, Czechoslovakia, and
the Polish Corridor. This became the aim of both
the anti-Bolsheviks and the three-bloc people from the early part
of 1937 to the end of 1939 (or even early
1940). These two cooperated and dominated
the government in that period. They split in the period 1939-1940,
with the "three-bloc" people, like Amery, Lord Halifax, and Lord
Lothian, becoming increasingly anti-German, while the
anti-Bolshevik crowd, like Chamberlain, Horace Wilson, and John
Simon, tried to adopt a policy based on a declared but unfought war
against Germany combined with an undeclared fighting war against
the Soviet Union. The split between these two groups appeared
openly in public and led to Chamberlain's fall from office when
Amery cried to Chamberlain, across the floor of the House of
Commons, on May 10, 1940, "In the name of God, go!"
Outside these two groups, and much more
numerous (but much more remote from the real instruments of
government), were the appeasers and the "peace at any price"
people. These were both used by the two inner groups to command
public support for their quite different policies. Of the two the
appeasers were much more important than the "peace at any price"
people. The appeasers swallowed the steady propaganda (much of it
emanating from Chatman House, The Times, the Round Table groups, or
Rhodes circles) that the Germans had been deceived and brutally
treated in 1919. For example, it was under pressure from seven
persons, including General Smuts and H. A. L. Fisher, as well as
Lord Milner himself, that Lloyd George made his belated demand on
June 2, 1919, that the German reparations be reduced and the
Rhineland occupation be cut from fifteen years to two. The
memorandum from which Lloyd George read these demands was
apparently drawn up by Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian), while the
minutes of the Council of Four, from which we get the record of
those demands, were taken down by Sir Maurice Hankey (as secretary
to the Supreme Council, a position obtained through Lord Esher). It
was Kerr (Lothian) who served as British member of the Committee of
Five which drew up the answer to the Germans' protest of May, 1919.
General Smuts was still refusing to sign the treaty because it was
too severe as late as June 2 3, 1919.
As a result of these attacks and a barrage
of similar attacks on the treaty which continued year after year,
British public opinion acquired a guilty conscience about the
Treaty of Versailles, and was quite unprepared to take any steps to
enforce it by 1930. On this feeling, which owed so much to the
British idea of sportsmanlike conduct toward a beaten opponent, was
built the movement for appeasement. This movement had two basic
assumptions: (a) that reparation must be made for Britain's
treatment of Germany in 1919 and (b) that if Germany's most obvious
demands, such as arms equality, remilitarization of the Rhineland,
and perhaps union with Austria, were met, Germany would become
satisfied and peaceful. 
The trouble with this argument was that once Germany reached
this point, it would be very difficult to prevent Germany from
going further (such as taking the Sudetenland and the Polish
Corridor). Accordingly, many of the appeasers, when this point was reached in
March 1938 went over to the anti-Bolshevik or
"three-bloc" point of view, while some even went into the "peace at
any price" group. It is likely that Chamberlain, Sir John Simon,
and Sir Samuel Hoare went by this road from appeasement to
anti-Bolshevism. At any rate, few influential people were still in
the appeasement group by 1939 in the sense that they believed that
Germany could ever be satisfied. Once this was realized,
The "peace at any price" people were both
few and lacking in influence in Britain, while the contrary, as we
shall see, was true in France. However, in the period August 1935
to March 1939 and especially in September 1938, the government
built upon the fears of this group by steadily exaggerating
Germany's armed might and belittling their own, by calculated
indiscretions (like the statement in September 1938 that there were
no real antiaircraft defenses in London), by constant hammering at
the danger of an overwhelming air attack without warning, by
building ostentatious and quite useless air-raid trenches in the
streets and parks of London, and by insisting through daily
warnings that everyone must be fitted with a gas mask immediately
(although the danger of a gas attack was nil).
In this way, the government put London
into a panic in 1938 for the first time since 1804 or even 1678.
And by this panic,
Chamberlain was able to get the British people to accept the
destruction of Czechoslovakia, wrapping it up in a piece of paper,
marked "peace in our time," which he obtained from Hitler, as he
confided to that ruthless dictator, "for British public
opinion." Once this panic passed,
Chamberlain found it impossible to get the British public to follow
his program, although he himself never wavered, even in 1940. He
worked on the appeasement and the "peace at any price" groups
throughout 1939, but their numbers dwindled rapidly, and since he
could not openly appeal for support on either the anti-Bolshevik or
the "three-bloc" basis, he had to adopt the dangerous expedient of
pretending to resist (in order to satisfy the British public)
while really continuing to
make every possible concession to Hitler which would bring Germany
to a common frontier with the Soviet Union,
all the while putting every pressure on Poland to negotiate and on
Germany to refrain from using force in order to gain time to wear
Poland down and in order to avoid the necessity of backing up by
action his pretense of resistance to Germany. This policy went
completely astray in the period from August 1939 to April
1940...
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