For example Poland, whose only "guarantees" were a declaration
of war, and the 'starting of the offensive' by French forces, as
described by General Gamelin's letter to the Polish military
attache in Paris (dated 10 September 1939), around a fortnight
after initial hostilities in Poland.
You must understand that Britain and France were forced against
their will to declare war on Germany.
What they wanted was to arrange another munich where Germany
would annex parts of polish territory and then according to these
strategists, Germany would go on and attack the Soviet Union.
But unfortuntely, Germany invaded Poland, so they had to declare
war otherwise they would had lost face because Britain had already
guaranteed Poland they would assist if Poland attacked.
That guarantee by Britain was also bullshit, designed to warn
Hitler not to attack, because if Germany attacked Poland, the
public in Britain would not accept it and Britain had to make some
sort of move against Germany and that would ruin Chamberlain's
grand strategy of forming an alliance with Germany against the
USSR.
The game gets more complicated once Britain and France declared
war, because they were still carrying out their plan of instigating
a German-Soviet war.
So they couldn't actually go and seriously fight Germany.
You can read the details of this commplex game here:
It is usually said that the events of March 1939 revealed
Hitler's real nature and real ambitions, and marked the end of
appeasement. This is certainly not true as
stated. It may have opened the eves of the
average man to the fact that appeasement was merely a kind of slow
suicide, and quite incapable of satisfying the appetites of
aggressors who were insatiable. It also made clear that Hitler was
not really concerned with self-determination or with a desire to
bring all Germans "back to the Reich." The annexation of
territories containing millions of Slavs showed that Hitler's real
aim was power and wealth and eventually world domination. Thus,
from March onward, it became almost impossible to sell appeasement
to the public, especially to the British public, who were
sufficiently sturdy and sensible to know when they had had
enough.
But the British public and the British government were two
different things, and it is quite untrue to say that the latter
learned Hitler's real ambitions in March 1939 and determined to
oppose them. Above all, it is completely
wrong to say this of Chamberlain, who, more and more, was running
foreign policy as his own personal
business.
Nevertheless, concessions to Germany continued. But now parallel
with concessions went a real effort to build up a strong front
against Hitler for the day when concessions would break down.
Moreover, concessions were different after March 17th because now
they had to be secret. They had to be secret because public opinion
refused any longer to accept any actions resembling appeasement,
but they were continued for several reasons. In the first place
British rearmament was slow, and concessions were given to win
time. In the second place the
projects of the anti-Bolsheviks and "three-bloc-world" supporters
demanded continued concessions. In the third place, Chamberlain
continued to work to achieve his seven-point settlement with Hitler
in the hope that he could suddenly present it to the British
electorate as a prelude to a triumphant General Election which he
planned for the winter of 19391940. Of these
three causes, the first, to gain time for rearmament, w-as the
least important, although it was the one most readily used to
justify secret concessions when they were found out. This is clear
from the nature of the concessions. These were frequently such as
to strengthen Germany rather than to gain time for Britain.
The projects of the
anti-Bolsheviks and the "three-bloc-world" supporters were too
dangerous to admit publicly, but they were sufficiently well known
in Berlin to lead to the belief, even in
moderate circles, that Britain would never go to war for Poland.
For example, Weizsไcker, the German secretary of state, chided
Nevile Henderson in June 1939 for abandoning his often-repeated
statement that "England desired to retain the sea; the European
Continent could be left to Germany." However, these two groups,
although still active in 1939, and even in 1940, had not originally
envisaged the complete destruction of Czechoslovakia or Poland.
They had expected that Hitler
would get the Sudentenland, Danzig, and perhaps the Polish Corridor
and that he would then be stabilized between the "oceanic bloc" and
the Soviet Union, with contact with the latter across the Baltic
States. It was expected that a rump
Czechoslovakia and a rump Poland would be able to survive between
Germany and Russia, as Holland or Switzerland could survive between
the oceanic bloc and Germany. Moreover, the "three-bloc-world"
supporters never wanted Hitler to drive southward either to the
Adriatic or to the Aegean. Accordingly, although divided in respect
to Romania and the Black Sea, they were determined to support
Turkey and Greece against both Germany and Italy...
http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#46
And don't expect any TV documentary, movie or history book to
tell you all these, because this interpretation of events is
suppressed in the english world.
But if you go to other worlds, they will tell you.
For example the left wing world:
Hitler denounced the treaties imposed on Germany following WW1
and commenced the rearmament of Germany. He intended to take his
revenge for Germany’s defeat in WW1 and for the seizure of German
colonies by Britain and France.
Far from opposing Nazism, however, the political leaders of
Britain and France and a number of other western countries believed
that they could use Hitler to destroy what they saw as a far
greater danger to their power and privileges — the Bolsheviks of
the Soviet Union...
Barthou brought the USSR into the League of Nations and, as
Germany and Japan left it, the Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov
began the fight for the adoption of the principle of collective
security.
However, influential leaders of the capitalist powers believed that
German fascism was the only bulwark against Bolshevism.
They confidently expected
that a re-armed Germany would sweep to the East and destroy the
centre of the Red contagion — the
USSR...
http://www.cpa.org.au/garchve05/1226ww2.html
If you rely on sources from the english world you won't get the
truth about Britain's agenda with Hitler.
It is suppressed.
LIke will you get the truth on japanese WWII aggression using
japanese sources?
No.
You won't.
You must get it from other sources.
...This idea of bringing Germany into
a collision with Russia was not to be found,
so far as the evidence shows, among any members of the inner circle
of the Milner Group. Rather it was to be found
among the personal associates of Neville
Chamberlain...
If, by means of another Munich,
he could have obtained a German-Polish settlement that would
satisfy Germany and avoid war, he would have taken
it. It was the hope of such an
agreement that prevented him from making any real agreement with
Russia, for it was, apparently, the expectation
of the British government that if the Germans could get the Polish
Corridor by negotiation, they could then drive into Russia across
the Baltic States. For this reason, in
the negotiations with Russia, Halifax refused any multilateral pact
against aggression, any guarantee of the Baltic States, or any
tripartite guarantee of Poland. ...
The unilateral guarantee to Poland given by Chamberlain on 31
March 1939 was also a reflection of what he believed the voters
wanted. He had no intention of
ever fulfilling the guarantee if it could possibly be
evaded and, for this reason, refused the
Polish requests for a small rearmament loan and to open immediate
staff discussions to implement the guarantee...
http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/cikkek/anglo_12b.html
Later, on November 25, Grippenberg reported his conversation
with a British government member who assured him that Britain and
France would not interfere in Germany's eastward expansion.
"Britain's position is as
follows: let's wait until Germany and the U.S.S.R. get involved in
a big conflict," the document reads.
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080929/117271264.html
