We give you land, provide expertise, and this is how the
Singapore army treats us.......
Australian Broadcasting Corporation
LATELINE
Late night news & current affairs
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TONY JONES: Two weeks ago it was reported that the Federal
government had given high-level assurances to concerned executives
that it supports the proposed takeover bid of Australia's second
largest telco by SingTel.
There's been no confirmation of that since the bid is still before
the Foreign Investment Review Board.
But the reports followed a statement by the Defence Minister, Peter
Reith, that national security issues posed no threat to the
takeover.
Given the close links between SingTel and the Singaporean
government, the national security issue has provoked both public
debate and deep concern in some sections of Australia's
intelligence community.
So, would the position be different if it were known that Singapore
had already used its links with Australia to spy on it or if it had
recruited an Australian mole in our most sensitive defence
communications facility?
Those are precisely the allegations being made by a number of
people in our next story, the first of a special two-part
investigation by Nick Grimm.
NICK GRIMM: Publicly, Singapore and Australia have long been the
best of friends.
But, eight years ago, even as we celebrated the arrival of the
first foreign forces to be stationed on Australian soil since World
War II, Singapore already had its spies in our midst.
PROFESSOR DES BALL, STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE STUDIES CENTRE: Singapore
is more actively engaged in intelligence collection activities in
this part of the world than any other Southeast Asian
country.
PROFESSOR ROSS BABBAGE, STRATEGY INTERNATIONAL: The reality is we
can't afford to be naive here.
It's not just one or two instances that have occurred in the last
20 years.
It's a whole series of instances.
NICK GRIMM: The allegations being raised tonight go much further
than the kind of low-level eavesdropping that occurs between most
nations.
WARREN REED, FORMER ASIS OFFICER: They're getting some of our most
closely guarded secrets and they're being sold by Australian
traitors.
NICK GRIMM: In the most serious incident that's been revealed, it's
alleged Singapore recruited an Australian military intelligence
officer to do its bidding at least 20 years ago.
Despite one arrest being made, it's understood the traitor in the
army's intelligence ranks was never caught.
PROFESSOR DES BALL: They still believed that someone was working
for the Singaporeans but it was not the individual who had been
charged in 1981.
NICK GRIMM: They essentially had the wrong man?
PROFESSOR DES BALL: Yes, there had been suspicions over the past
decade that, in so far as some other person had been, and may still
have been, working for the Singaporeans, that a fall guy had, in
fact, been set up to provide a cover for the operation.
NICK GRIMM: So there is the risk that that compromise of our
military intelligence may still exist, that the person may still be
out there and may still have access to confidential material?
PROFESSOR DES BALL: That's quite possible.
NICK GRIMM: Lateline understands that ASIO has ensured both the
Australian and Singapore governments are fully aware that it knows
the extent of the problem.
One of the few official acknowledgements of Singapore's
infiltration of our military intelligence system, is a brief
mention of espionage by Asian governments in ASIO's 1994 annual
report to parliament.
The report stated: "During the year, ASIO identified a number of
intelligence functionaries working in Australia and gained new
insights into the interests of several foreign governments."
Now, Lateline can make public for the first time that one of the
countries of most concern is Singapore.
And, according to Australia's leading military intelligence expert,
Professor Des Ball, Singapore did not cease its spying activities
when ASIO published its report.
PROFESSOR DES BALL: Those activities included photographic
intelligence, signals intelligence collection and, quite possibly,
the recruitment of Australians to spy on their behalf.
NICK GRIMM: The extent of Singapore's espionage activity in
Australia may have always remained an official secret but for
corporate takeover plans by the Singapore government-controlled
telecommunications company, SingTel, that would see it swallow up
Australia's second largest telco, Cable & Wireless Optus.
With the deal, goes ownership of Australia's main defence
satellite, the channel through which many of our most sensitive
military communications are sent.
So disturbed by this prospect are some in defence circles, that
senior figures, with close links within the Australian government
and the Defence Department, are now prepared to go public with
details of just how extensively Singapore has breached our military
secrets.
In doing so, they're prepared to trigger a diplomatic incident and
put their own professional reputations on the line in a bid to
protect our national security.
Professor Ross Babbage is a former assistant secretary of the
Australian Defence Department and now a leading regional security
analyst.
You're saying we shouldn't take the Singaporeans at their word when
they say, "We will obey your laws"?
PROFESSOR ROSS BABBAGE: I have trouble personally accepting that
that would be the case, given their track record, but, if the
government is convinced, well then it seems to me that the
Australian public has got a right to know why they are convinced
that, in fact, the Singaporeans are going to play straight.
NEWSREEL: Early in the morning and a quiet invasion is under
way.
The Singaporeans have arrived.
NICK GRIMM: In 1993, part of the Singapore Air Force took up
residence at Pearce Air Base near Perth in WA.
The Singaporeans had come in search of wide-open airspace where
they could conduct flight training operations without agitating
their neighbouring states like Malaysia.
Pearce offered the perfect setting.
However, it also provided access to a number of other Australian
military installations and soon after the Singaporeans arrived
claims emerged that some of their pilots were taking aerial
photographs of things they shouldn't.
ROBERT KARNIOL, JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY: I was told by a number of
Australian defence officials that, in the early 1990s that there
was a problem with some of the Singaporean pilots very aggressively
flying out of the controlled areas that their flights were supposed
to be limited into and engaging in photo reconnaissance
activity.
NICK GRIMM: Robert Karniol is Asia Pacific editor with the
international defence journal, Jane's Defence Weeky.
When he examined spy rumours seven years ago, he encountered only
contradictions.
ROBERT KARNIOL: One Singaporean friend of mine who I asked about
this directly said that, in fact, this whole situation centred
around a single incident where one particularly enthusiastic young
pilot took it on himself to snap some pictures.
NICK GRIMM: According to that version of the story, the issue was
discussed by the two governments and the film was returned and the
problem ended there.
The Australians that I've spoken to disagree with that and say the
problem was broader.
NICK GRIMM: Professor Ball says the Singaporeans were also
eavesdropping with the help of a modified C-130 Hercules aircraft
filled with electronic monitoring equipment and fitted with
retractable antennae, a spy plane which they could fly in and out
of our air bases unhindered.
PROFESSOR DES BALL: It would have told them a lot about the sorts
of electronic equipment that is around our defence facilities, our
radars, the operating frequencies of those radars, different sorts
of navigation beacons.
NICK GRIMM: If the spying had stopped there, the breach to our
military security would have been serious enough.
But it appears to have gone much further.
It may not look like much, but this field of antennae near
Toowoomba in Queensland provides a clue to one of Australia's most
sensitive military secrets.
At least, it's supposed to be secret.
This is the home of the Australian Army's Cabarlah Electronic
Warfare Unit.
Professor Ball says a spy may have been active at this highly
confidential military base for the past two decades.
PROFESSOR DES BALL: In 1993-'94, there was quite significant
concern at the DSD listening station at Cabarlah in Queensland,
just near Toowoomba, about whether that facility had been
penetrated by Singaporean intelligence authorities, in other words,
whether the Singaporeans had managed to recruit someone at that
listening station.
NICK GRIMM: That must have been pretty serious, if that station had
been compromised by a foreign power?
PROFESSOR DES BALL: Yes, it would have been extremely
serious.
DSD, our listening organisation, is the most secret, the most
sensitive and, undoubtedly, the most productive of all the
Australian intelligence organisations.
NICK GRIMM: According to Professor Ball, key military intelligence
officers at the Cabarlah listening station were told in a security
briefing in 1994 to be on guard against "examples of the hostile
nature of the Singaporean authorities."
It appears the gathering of senior officers was warned that a spy
may have been active in the Seven Signals regiment since 1981, when
it was first discovered that someone had been passing highly
confidential material on to a senior Singaporean naval
officer.
PROFESSOR DES BALL: There had been earlier evidence, going back to
the early 1980s, that the Singaporeans had, in fact, recruited
someone already then at Cabarlah, a particular army person was in
fact arrested by the Australian Army Intelligence Corps, but
charges were never proceeded with against him, not because it
wasn't believed that penetration hadn't occurred.
Indeed, it was believed that the Singaporeans had recruited someone
there, but it was decided that the particular person that had been
charged was, in fact, not guilty that, if, in fact, there was
someone involved, it was not him.
It was someone else.
NICK GRIMM: And that other person has never been located?
PROFESSOR DES BALL: No.
NICK GRIMM: Warren Reed is a former intelligence officer of 10
years standing with the Australian Security and Intelligence
Service.
He says Singaporean and other Asian spies have long gone unchecked,
because the Australian government wants to avoid scandal.
WARREN REED: We should have criminal prosecutions.
We're talking about possible Singaporean espionage activity on
Australian soil.
I might ask you to name to me one spy from an Asian country we have
ever caught on Australian soil in the last 20, 30 years.
Can you name one?
I can't.
NICK GRIMM: Does that mean they don't exist?
WARREN REED: It certainly doesn't mean they don't exist.
We would be naive in the extreme to believe that intelligence
operatives from Asian countries aren't operating on our soil and
aren't being successful.
NICK GRIMM: According to Ross Babbage, Professor Ball's allegations
come from reliable sources and are just the tip of the
iceberg.
PROFESSOR ROSS BABBAGE: Oh, there's a whole range of things.
In fact, there are other things as well as the ones that you have
listed.
There's a whole range of things, a portfolio of activities, that
have been undertaken in the last few years.
NICK GRIMM: Professor Babbage says he won't reveal details of what
he knows about Singapore's spying, because he'd risk being charged
with betraying Australia's military secrets.
But he does confirm it's been going on and he's gone public now
because he fears vital national security issues are at stake.
And he says there are many people within the Defence Department who
share his concern.
PROFESSOR ROSS BABBAGE: There are some people who have the view
that the Singaporeans almost can't help themselves in some
agencies, you know, when they get into a situation where they can
collect some information, it's almost congenital and they're
inclined to do it anyway and that's unfortunate and it really has
put some stresses in the relationship, stresses where, in a range
of situations, I'm well aware, that some senior Australians have
been very uncomfortable in allowing routine access by Singaporeans
to defence bases and other installations.
NICK GRIMM: So far, the Australian government has indicated to
Singapore that it believes steps can be taken to protect our
defence communications.
SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE: You have your processes here
and we respect that there must be due process.
NICK GRIMM: But there's a view in Australian defence circles that
the Optus takeover shouldn't be allowed to go ahead, under any
circumstances, regardless of what safeguards are put in
place.
Certainly, it seems the time of these revelations coming now are
clearly calculated to increase pressure on the Australian
government to reject the deal in the interests of our national
security.
PROFESSOR ROSS BABBAGE: I personally would take a lot of convincing
that this is -- this can be organised and arranged in such a way
that Australia's interests really are going to be
safeguarded.
NICK GRIMM: Is part of the concern that regardless of what the
Singaporeans do, the Australian security system will be compromised
or potentially compromised?
PROFESSOR DES BALL: There will always be questions about the extent
to which every particular vulnerability, in terms of every channel,
every circuit, every switching point, has been covered.
That concern will be never-ending. 
