source :
http://www.rt66.com/~korteng/SmallArms/CCF1stCampaign1.htm
October 25-November 5, 1950
China's 1st Phase Offensive
The CCF entered the Korean War with a short, violent probing
offensive. Although elements of three CCF Armies ... the 38th,
39th, and 40th ... were in place, apparently only about 30,000 CCF
foot infantry were mainly deployed. These veteran troops, directed
by skillful patrol actions and experienced planning, wreaked
devastation among our unprepared and disorganized forces. They
destroyed the ROK 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments and also
inflicted about 800 casualties on our 8th Cavalry Regiment and
capturing over half their equipment while smashing us back.
The CCF tactics were strange to us, they being extremely effective
by night and by infiltration and highly effective roadblocks. Even
their methods of communications, such as the whistles used in
small-unit assault above, seemed eerie and helped demoralize many
of our troops.
On November 5, the CCF broke off contact to evaluate the results of
their attack and the capabilities of their enemies. This was
musunderstood by the UN High Command, who fatally underestimated
both the strength and the intent of the CCF forces facing them.
After re-grouping, Eighth Army again formed on the Chongchon River,
and prepared to launch a general assault on November 25, an assault
to get our forces "home for Christmas."
In retrospect, this was an incredible, incomprehensible
blunder.
Shortly, China was to make a similar and equally fatal
blunder.
Such is war.
another article ...
The accomplishments of the CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) against
an army which was far better armed, and which enjoyed total air
supremacy, are truly remarkable. Although the NK had been well
armed by Russia, and carefully prepared for their invasion of the
South, the CCF were so ill-equipped to challenge a modern army that
it is almost understandable why our Far East Command initially
thought they were an ineffective rabble of "volunteers". Armed with
a bewildering mixture of British, US, Japanese and other weapons,
presenting an incomprehensible logistics problem, without heavy
artillery or tanks, and no air power, it was difficult for high
command to take them seriously. Plus, they gave no obvious sign of
their entry, let alone their large numbers, until they first
attacked.
Trained and battle hardened in guerilla warfare, the CCF carried
none of the baggage of a modern army. Masters of concealment, they
moved and fought best by night. Wearing thick, padded, green or
white uniforms, caps with a red star, carrying a personal weapon,
grenades, 80 rounds of ammunition, a few stick grenades, spare foot
rags, sewing kit and a week's rations of fish, rice and tea, their
working day began about 7 pm. They marched until about 3am, then
prepared camouflaged positions for the day. Only scout units moved
during daylight, to determine routes for the next night's march,
and they were ordered, under penalty of death, to freeze motionless
if they heard aircraft. Their only heavy weapons were mortars, but
they came in increasingly vast numbers.
The CCF didn't begin seriously fighting until October 25, when it
crushed the ROK 6th Division in an attack that increased and lasted
for 10 days, further smashing back our 1st Cavalry Division with
the ROK units. In the east, the 7th Marines had our only successes,
in relief of battered ROK units at the Sudong Gorge, 30 miles below
Chosin. The 7th killed around 1500 Chinese, destroying the fighting
capability of the CCF 124th division in a brutal 3-day
battle.
1stMarDiv commander General Smith had been determined that the
Marines would be successful in their first battle with the CCF,
which they were. But the 124th was only one division in the CCF
42nd Army. General Smith wondered where the other two divisions
were.
This probing first CCF strike effectively ended the Eighth Army
offensive, for the moment.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
