PLA Ground Forces
PLA ground forces have a considerable numerical advantage over
Taiwans Army and Marine forces. Three group armies are based in
Nanjing Military Region opposite Taiwan, and several others most
likely would be included as part of the primary attack
force in the event of an all-out invasion of the island. Airborne
units, special operations forces, and marine units most likely
would support these group armies. Despite its numerical advantage,
Chinas main ground forces have shortcomings in such areas as
sealift and logistics. However, China is steadily expanding its
ability to transport ground forces by air. Special forces could
play an important role in achieving objectives in which limited
goals, scale of force, and time would be crucial to victory.
Special forces missions could include reconnaissance, surveillance,
targeting, and battle damage assessments; capturing or
assassinating VIPs; locating or destroying communication assets,
transport nodes, and
logistic depots; capturing or destroying airfields and ports;
supporting invasion forces; destroying air defense assets; and
conducting denial and deception and information operations.
Amphibious Invasion
If all other military options for subjugating Taiwan failed,
Beijing could try to occupy the entire island of Taiwan. Such an
operation would require a major commitment of civilian air and
maritime transport assets, and success would not be guaranteed. The
PLA's
success in a D-Day-style invasion of Taiwan would rest on a number
of variables, some tangible -- principally lack of amphibious lift
-- as well as a number of intangibles, including personnel and
equipment attrition rates on both sides of the Strait;
interoperability of PLA forces; and the ability of China's logistic
system to support the necessarily high tempo of operations. For an
invasion to succeed, Beijing would have to conduct a multifaceted
campaign, involving all of the above options in concert. The PLA
most likely would encounter great difficulty conducting such a
sophisticated campaign throughout the remainder of the decade.
Nevertheless, the campaign could succeed -- barring third-party
intervention -- if Beijing were willing to accept the political,
economic, diplomatic, and military costs that an invasion would
produce.
PLA Counters to Foreign Intervention
Beijing sees Washington as the principal hurdle to any attempt to
use military force to regain Taiwan. Therefore, deterring or
defeating foreign intervention ahead of Taiwans capitulation or
defeat would be integral to Beijings strategy.
Antiaccess Strategy
China could consider a sea- denial strategy to hold at risk U.S.
naval forces approaching the Taiwan Strait. Deep-water naval mines,
submarines, cruise missiles, and even special forces could be
employed to threaten a U.S. aircraft carrier. This strategys
tactical elements might include shallow and deep-water mines,
submarines, and surface combatants. Information operations assets
could attack U.S. C4ISR and logistic systems.
Denial and Deception (D&D)
From Chinas perspective, denial and deception are interrelated.
The goal of D&D is to induce the other side to take action
that will benefit the deceiver in attaining his goals. China uses
military D&D to induce an adversary to make incorrect decisions
and take
military actions that favor the Chinese. Chinese D&D practices
appear to be intended to delay or reduce U.S. diplomatic and
military roles in crises. Chinese D&D concepts include
counter-surveillance measures limiting the flow of intelligence
adversaries can gather on China, such as restricting news,
isolating personnel, and blocking core intelligence. Strategic
deception would interfere with enemy surveillance. China also
could transmit a large volume of false information to enemy
surveillance systems. Moreover, the PLA could attempt to conceal
and disguise
the battlefield to show the false while hiding the true
situation.
Underground Facilities The Chinese believe they can defeat the U.S.
intelligence apparatus by hiding military activity. China has built
civil and military underground facilities for at least four
decades, initially because of fear of a possible war with the
former Soviet Union. Enormous resources were dedicated to building
national command posts, civil defense facilities, and associated
communications in defensible nuclear-hardened underground
facilities. Several of these facilities have fallen into disrepair
owing to inadequate maintenance, but China implemented a
modernization program in the early 1970s through the early
1980s.
These complexes and others like them have been expanded recently
following the Gulf War and other U.S. military operations. Chinese
exp erts have noted that long- range air attacks have become an
important pattern of modern warfare. The Chinese believe that a
successful strategic air campaign involves attacks on the defending
country over a long period, with emphasis on C3 centers, missile
facilities (ballistic and air defense), airfields,
and transportation hubs. China is implementing these lessons with a
program to camouflage and protect such potential targets by
expanding underground facilities. Operation ALLIED FORCE appears to
have had at least as much impact on PLA
thinking as the Gulf War, although more as a validation of earlier
assessments of the trends of modern warfare than as a catalyst for
change. PLA commentary on NATOs Kosovo air operation concluded
that a superior enemys situational awareness and
precision-strike systems could be stymied through effective, and
often low-technology, counter-reconnaissance measures, such as
camouflage and concealment, simple decoys, dispersion, and frequent
movement of forces. U.S. air operations reinforced the PLA focus on
using underground facilities, landline communications, and
well-concealed supply depots.
A Non-HEMP Unconventional Nuclear Weapon Option
Effects other than high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP)
result from a high-altitude nuclear burst, which causes a
substantial change in the ionization of the upper atmosphere,
including the ionosphere and magnetosphere. These effects would be
likely to significantly degrade warfighting capabilities, including
communication links, radar transmissions, and the full spectrum of
electro-optic sensors. Depending on the weapon and the altitude of
the burst, these effects could persist from seconds to days and
extend over thousands of square kilometers. Russian and U.S.
experiences with high- altitude nuclear weapon effects have been
well documented, and a number of papers are in the public domain
and possibly would be known to physicists and engineers worldwide.
Thus, PLA theorists who have become aware of these electromagnetic
effects may have considered using a nuclear weapon as an
unconventional attack option. China could use
high-altitude nuclear bursts to disrupt enemy C4ISR. Sophisticated
military capabilities that exploit the full electromagnetic
spectrum are more vulnerable to these effects than are less
advanced capabilities. In contrast to HEMP, ionization effects
would occur
regardless of the weapons design or sophistication. This
phenomenon raises the possibility of an adversary employing an
unsophisticated nuclear weapon as an asymmetric attack
option.
Taiwans Strengths in Countering PLA Courses of Action
Asymmetric capabilities that Taiwan possesses or is acquiring could
deter a Chinese attack by making it unacceptably costly. Taiwan
most likely will expand these capabilities either in tandem with or
in lieu of improving its conventional forces.
Strike Capabilities Against the Mainland
Taipei political and military leaders have recently suggested
acquiring weapon systems capable of standoff strikes against the
Chinese mainland as a cost-effective means of deterrence. Taiwans
Air Force already has a latent capability for airstrikes against
China. Leaders have publicly cited the need for ballistic and
land-attack cruise missiles. Since Taipei cannot match Beijings
ability to field offensive systems, proponents of
strikes against the mainland apparently hope that merely presenting
credible threats to Chinas urban population or high- value
targets, such as the Three Gorges Dam, will deter
Chinese military coercion.
Diplomatic Support
President Chens administration has sought to elicit international
sympathy for Taiwans plight in the face of Chinas growing
ballistic missile force, for which the island has no adequate
countermeasures. A diplomatic initiative begun late in 2002 sought
to draw international attention to the growing cross-Strait missile
imbalance. A resolution demanding that China withdraw its missiles
from the Taiwan Strait area was initially selected as the topic for
the islands first popular referendum. Taipei probably hopes
these efforts will deter such an attack by increasing the prospect
for diplomatic consequences.
Computer Network Attack
Taiwans limited ability to attack Chinese military bases has
prompted some Taiwan authors to endorse attacking Chinas command
and control systems to achieve information superiority. Specific
targets would include Chinese airports, command and
control centers, and communication nodes. Taiwan has significant
potential in this area, thanks to the islands high information
technology level and the militarys ability to conscript personnel
from a tech-savvy population.
Psychological Warfare
The Taiwan militarys principal psychological warfare (PSYWAR)
organization is the General Political Warfare Bureau of the
Ministry of National Defense (MND). Subordinate units conducting
strategic psychological operations include the 1st Psychological
Operations (PSYOP) Group, three Army PSYOP companies
responsible
for publishing and propaganda, and the Political Warfare College,
which trains PSYWAR cadre. The Army PSYWAR Preparedness Center was
set up in January 2002. This center will carry out future PSYOP
missions with the armed forces' first wholly dedicated PSYWAR
units, integrated with combat intelligence. If the PSYWAR
Preparedness Center succeeds, a special command organization will
be set up in the MND. Army, Navy, and Air Force PSYOP units
probably will be organized in the future.
Electronic Warfare
EW is a top Taiwan military priority because of concerns about
Chinas own developing EW capabilities. During the islands
HANKUANG-19 exercise in 2003, tactical EW units exercised jamming
against command and control networks and intelligence
collection systems supporting enemy amphibious landings. Taiwans
MND Communications Development Office also reportedly has a
strategic EW capability. Taiwan has more than 30 other ground
electronic reconnaissance stations and communications intelligence
stations.
Information Operations
Taiwans MND has identified information warfare as a key area for
modernization. The military intends that information operations,
along with command and control systems, will survive an initial PLA
assault. Taiwans ongoing Posheng C4ISR modernization
project includes electronic countermeasure and electronic
counter-countermeasure enhancements. These efforts aim to ensure
Taiwans C4ISR survives kinetic and nonkinetic attacks, such as
cyberwarfare. In the past 2 years, training exercises worked
to set a firm foundation for information operations
capabilities.