luckily for us... there are those in SAF who sees the future of
unmanned combat vehicles for all 3 services of SAF 6 years
ago!!....
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1998/Vol24_1/4.htm
Unmanned Warfare
by MAJ Tew See Mong
INTRODUCTION
Manpower scarcity has been a perennial problem for many armed
forces around the world. Over the years, there has been a decline
in the absolute numerical make-up of these organisations, which, if
not managed properly, can affect their operational capabilities.
This scarcity is a situation that is unlikely to improve in the
foreseeable future, given the current low birth rates and
conflicting demands for manpower.
From a numerical perspective, this constraint means that the armed
forces cannot mass together the sheer number of ground troops as
before. From a risk perspective, every soldier on the battlefield
is now a precious resource which should not be exposed to
unnecessary risks. This translates into further constraints for
battle planners, who may not have the leeway to select the riskier
but more expedient military options. Finally, from the skills
perspective, smaller population bases make it difficult to find,
select, train and develop specialised combatant resources like
pilots and submariners.
Thus, it is crucial that new avenues be explored to circumvent this
prevalent trend of manpower shortages. One viable solution lies in
exploiting technology and pushing the limits of force multipliers.
Within the domain of force multipliers, there lies a relatively new
discipline, unmanned warfare.
DEFINITION
The definition of 'unmanned' chosen for this article is fairly
loose, as the emphasis is not solely on taking men out of machines
but also on how to employ technology to make better use of its
manpower. Thus, while the focus is on unmanned warfare in its
literal sense, the article will also touch on some equipment or
systems which result in lower manpower usage (or higher operational
capability with the same manning). In so doing, please accept that
some aspects of this article border on technological innovation as
opposed to unmanned warfare per se.
POTENTIAL OF UNMANNED WARFARE
Unmanned warfare is a relatively new approach in the conduct of
warfare, where the boundaries are not well charted and limited
largely by our imaginations. Unmanned warfare will not only help
overcome manpower and resource constraints but will also enhance
operational capabilities, since it can now move into areas where
mankind has previously feared to tread. With unmanned warfare, the
competitive advantage can be swung such that human numerical
superiority is no longer an overwhelming advantage or a
pre-requisite for victory.
WHY UNMANNED?
The impetus to go unmanned include optimising the deployment of
manpower, enhancing operational capabilities and being able to
venture into territory once out-of-bounds to mankind (e.g. deep
ocean, space). In particular, unmanned systems should be used to
replace humans where the work is dangerous, dirty or dull.
Some specific advantages in going unmanned include:
Reduction in manpower requirement. Developments in unmanned
technology now enables machines to perform tasks once undertaken by
operators with equal if not better precision. This direct
substitution of manpower will lead to a corresponding reduction in
manpower needs.
Overcome fatigue and human error. Machines do not tire out as
easily as men. Operations that require constant alert or repetitive
work over long durations are thus potential areas where unmanned
warfare can be profitably employed.
Minimise hazards. Risks to humans can be reduced as unmanned
systems can take over hazardous jobs previously done by human
beings.
Cost savings. Besides manpower savings, there are also cost
reductions in the form of human cost (life) savings, training cost
savings or even system cost savings as new unmanned systems can
enhance work flow and improve general work cycles.
Despite these advantages, there are several limitations which must
be recognised and reconciled. Some of the limitations
include:
Decision making. Although unmanned systems are becoming
increasingly sophisticated and 'intelligent', it is still difficult
to entrust machines with subjective decision making. We must avoid
careless delegation of responsibilities to technology that perform
only under programmed patterns.
Applicability. In certain areas and vocations, unmanned warfare
acts merely as a catalyst to facilitate achieving the ultimate
goal. The claim that there is no victory until the humble foot
soldier occupies the objective is likely to remain valid for some
time yet.
Diminution of esprit de corps. As manpower is increasingly
scattered, we could witness diminishing avenues for display of
teamwork, leadership, valour and other human qualities that make up
a well trained and well-oiled armed force. This gradual 'erosion'
of values belonging to the profession of arms must be guarded
against.
LAND THEATRE UNMANNED WARFARE
The land theatre has traditionally been the largest employers of
manpower. With reducing manpower and increasing battlefield risks,
technology is no longer regarded as just a force multiplier, but
rather one that would produce a paradigm shift in
warfighting.
Manpower requirements can be dramatically reduced in the
battlefield with unmanned platforms. UAVs, coupled with appropriate
sensors, are able to give commanders a bird's eye view of the
battlefield, without having to incur risks to himself, observers or
pilots. Such a view has obvious benefits - to the intelligence
community, to manoeuvre commanders and to targeting agencies. UAVs
can also be employed as rebro or electronic warfare platforms. In
the longer term, armed UAVs may well become operationally and
economically viable, thus enabling them to perform tactical attack
roles.
Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicles (TUGV), the ground equivalent of
UAVs, are able to perform some of the roles currently done by UAVs.
Equipped with weaponry or sensors, they could complement or even
replace some of the roles assumed by scouts and signallers. In
these roles, one edge of the TUGV over the UAV is its staying power
and ability to hold ground. TUGV is also able to breach and open
minefields/ obstacles and clear axes for armour and logistics
re-supply.
Unmanned Ground Sensors (UGS) are a cost effective replacement for
manned systems that have previously been used for monitoring or for
communications. They can, for example, be deployed by helicopters
or C-130 to critical points to detect time critical mobile targets
(i.e. manoeuvre forces, tank columns). They can also be used as
signals nodes to serve as communication relay platforms, thus
relieving signals personnel from performing a tedious and time
consuming job.
Dramatic break throughs in robotics and tele-operated mine
breaching can greatly reduce the labour-intensive nature of
mine-clearing. Also, development of new mine detection technology
now permits untrained troopers, using devices which incorporate
thermal imaging and ground penetrating radar, to be able to detect
metallic and non-metallic mines. This reduces the dependence on
specialised combat engineers and simultaneously increases
operational capability through speedy mine detection.
There are a few additional unmanned systems that are a long way
from seeing operational employment, but which are worth mentioning
in view of their long term potential. For example, developments in
unmanned technology include robots that can undertake dangerous and
dirty work. The US military has been pursuing the concept of
'Pointman' for some time. Pointman is a light-weight, sensor-laden,
armed robot used to reconnoiter buildings, bunkers and tunnels, in
order to detect booby traps, explosives and the enemy. It will be
able to climb stairs, operate in all weather and light conditions,
and is expected to be especially useful in what the US Army terms
'operations other than war'.
Still looking at longer term developments, armour units may one day
field remotely-controlled tanks. One of the modes of employment is
to have one manned tank control and operate two unmanned,
remote-controlled tanks. Navigation and targeting inputs provided
by the tank commander are utilised by the remote-controlled tanks
to acquire and destroy targets. The firepower of armour units can
hence be enhanced tremendously with fewer or similar numbers of
tank crews.
Remotely-controlled self-propelled guns or howitzers could operate
together with manned guns using the same concept as the remote
controlled tanks. This concept seems closer to fruition than
unmanned tanks, as the technological challenges appear less
daunting. The need for human judgement in each individual fighting
unit also appears less critical.
UNMANNED WARFARE IN THE AIR
Plagued with constraints of limited human resources and a sizable
reduction in the pool of youths who fulfill stringent recruitment
requirements, air forces around the world will be compelled to
explore means to maintain or extend their operational capabilities
with an increasingly trim fighting force.
The employment of unmanned platforms in the modern battlefield
serves to alleviate problems caused by the shortage in manpower and
resources. In employing unmanned platforms, pilots may also be
removed from aircraft penetrating defended enemy airspace, thus
reducing the danger arising from exposure to hostile fire.
The benefits are immediately obvious. First, human attrition will
be reduced. Second, the aircrew whose functions are now assumed by
unmanned platforms can be channeled to other crucial functions like
air defence, C31 and transportation missions. Finally, planners
will be able to undertake more risky but decisive combat missions,
such as SEAD, without exposing aircrew to excessive risk.
UAVs can broadly be characterised as lethal and non-lethal systems.
As its name suggests, non-lethal UAVs refers to the class of UAVs
used for reconnaissance, surveillance, relay, target designation,
ECM, SIGINT, ELINT, radar decoy and meteorological surveillance.
Lethal UAVs, of course, refer to the class of UAVs which inflicts
physical damage to enemy assets or installations operations.
Non-Lethal UAVs
Many non-lethal UAV roles have become well-established in many
armed forces. Reconnaissance UAVs are widely used to map the
enemy's defence locations, practices, electronic profiles and
vulnerabilities. As their endurance and payload improve, these UAVs
can take on the more demanding surveillance and airborne early
warning functions as well. EW UAVs are capable of using chaff and
ECM to degrade the enemy's radar or communications. Used together
with anti-radiation missiles or drones, these EW UAVs can
effectively shut down the enemy's radar operations. In SEAD)
operations, UAVs can be deployed as decoys to entice the defenders
to turn on their radars or fire their missiles at the wrong
targets. Manned strikers following behind the UAVs can then move in
to complete their missions with relative ease.
Lethal UAVs
Lethal UAVs can best be looked at by dividing them into two
distinct categories: counter-air and strike. I will examine these
two components separately and assess the viability of UAVs to
replace manned aircraft during wartime.
Air-to-air combat is very dynamic and dependent upon the pilot's
judgment and skill to outwit and out-manoeuver the aggressor so as
to get into an advantageous position for the kill. This applies
even when an aircraft is armed with the most advanced AAMs,
especially if the enemy is similarly equipped. Furthermore, in an
air battle, the air picture is usually a complex one, with many
real-time injects like weather, use of ECM or ECCM, changes in
tactics, attntion, etc. The pilots, with the help of GCI, will have
to make impromptu, split- second decisions to circumvent the
friction of war.
The use of UAVs as interceptors will expose one of its biggest
shortcomings; its lack of decision making abilities. However
advanced the UAV, it is still unable to replace the pilot in a
dog-fight. The situational awareness is just not the same. More
often than not, UAVs are very scenario dependent and operate well
only in a predictable environment. The lack of a human on board
limits a UAV to perform mostly pre-programmed standard
functions.
Although UAVs cannot replace manned fighters in air-to-air combat,
they can be used as decoys to reduce friendly losses. Decoys can be
scrambled together with manned interceptors to complicate the
enemy's air picture, distracting their pilots or causing them to
expend their missiles on the decoys.
Strike missions are a hazardous task as the strike aircraft are
susceptible to many threats: enemy fighters, SAMs, AAA etc. A
typical strike mission would involve a lot of resources. Besides
the strikers, sweepers to fly ahead and clear the path for their
transit. In addition, to have accompanying escort fighters are
needed to eliminate hostile aircraft that slip through to threaten
the strike aircraft.
UAVs can be used to reduce the heavy demands and risks of strike
missions. Many strike aircraft and bombers follow a pre-determined
route into enemy territory and strike specific targets on the
ground. The predictable nature of this task makes it suitable for
UAV execution. Technically, the cruise missile is a small,
disposable UAV. These missiles are cost-effective, proven in war,
and do not need escorts or sweepers. Re-usable bomber UAVs are also
under development, but these are probably less flexible and
effective than missiles as they would require a great deal more
support for them to fulfill their role.
A final benefit of using UAVs is that they are less dependent on
runways. Most unmanned platforms are easier to store and deploy
than fixed wing aircraft, and many do not need a long runway to
launch from. Of particular significance, land or sea launched
cruise missiles would allow an armed force to retain a long-range
strike capability even if its runways were closed and its aircraft
temporarily grounded.
NAVAL UNMANNED WARFARE
Unmanned platforms are relatively new naval forces. Naval forces
should consider adopting more unmanned systems in the naval
theatre, with manned warships deployed as a controlling force or a
follow-up strike force when a high casualty rate has been inflicted
on the opposing force.
They are the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Unmanned Undersea
Vehicle (UUV) and Sound Ocean Surveillance System (SOSUS). The
following discusses the ways these platforms can replace or
supplement a navy's manned platforms and improve its operational
effectiveness.
UAVs
Navies should acquire a mix of ground based and sea launched UAVs.
Complete surveillance packages configured for tactical surveillance
should be available in the sea launched version. Real time
data-linked, probably through satellite communications, should be
the main command and control requirement so that commanders ashore
and at sea are able assess the reconnaissance picture. High
adaptability to mission changes and reassignment should also be
essential features of the vehicle.
Land based UAVs should augment the manned Maritime Patrol Aircraft
(MPA) so that round the clock surveillance and intelligence
collection can be achieved. These UAVs would be especially useful
at the beginning of war when naval warships have to be deployed
beyond NADA controlled areas. The UAVs will remove the need to send
manned MPAs to unprotected airspace, thus reducing the risk to the
aircraft and its crew.
Sea-launched UAVs would by necessity, be lighter and have less
endurance than their land based counterparts. However, they have an
important role in that they provide flexibility and autonomy to the
commanders at sea, who can then solve immediate tactical
surveillance problems without assistance from shore.
For littoral warfare, UAVs should be able to solve some of the
problems when ships operate in proximity to land. When warships
operate in hostile coastal waters, the risk is invariantly higher
as they are subjected to threat from ashore and ambushing enemy
military or para-military craft. Surveillance pictures provided by
UAVs would finish task group commanders with valuable early warning
of enemy presence.
Clearance of island groups by warships is another challenging task.
In this case, a naval force should further exploit unmanned
technology by acquiring remote controlled arsenal craft equipped
with short to medium range high discrimination missiles to engage
hostile craft detected by the UAV.
In the area of naval gun fire support, UAVs can provide spotting
and eventually Target Damage Assessment to the Shore Bombardment
Commander.
Undersea Vehicles
The application of unmanned vehicles for underwater warfare is
predominantly in the area of mine clearance. Mine clearance in
hostile waters can be fulfilled with the Self-propelled Acoustic
and Magnetic Minesweeping System (SAMMS). This unmanned, remotely
controlled mine sweeping craft is capable of establishing a safe
route through mined waters.
Navies could consider acquiring a passive mine clearance capability
so as to expand their mine-sweeping versatility. The US Navy is
currently developing a tactical scale Unmanned Undersea Vehicle
(UUV) to conduct covert, fully autonomous, long duration mine
warfare and tactical oceanography in littoral waters. To date, the
UUV has demonstrated a navigational accuracy of 0.18% of distance
traveled. Such a vehicle allows naval forces to conduct covert mine
clearance and seabed surveys during POT when aggressive
counter-mine measures could not be conducted. Another advantage of
the UUV is that it can be launched covertly from a submarine.
Anti-Submarine Warfare
Manned assets are still largely used in the area of Anti-Submarine
Warfare, as it remains the playground for tacticians. However,
SOSUS can be used to monitor submarine movements at various key
points in our area of operations. This will reduce the demands on
manned anti-submarine warfare assets. With further development in
UAVs, ASW packages can also be fitted onboard to provide an
extended arm to airborne ASW.
TECHNOLOGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS
Competition to dominate the battlefield of the future is
competition to create, adopt and dominate emerging technologies. In
the area of unmanned warfare, getting ahead requires:
a. A keen understanding of how future battles would be fought and
how unmanned warfare fits in.
b. A developmental process for exploring, assimilating and
exploiting current and emerging future technologies applicable in
unmanned systems.
The unmanned warfare paradigm may be defined in three dimensions.
Service groups broadly describe the various services in the Armed
Forces, or who is being satisfied. Service functionalites describe
service needs, or what is being satisfied. Technologies describe
the way, or how the service groups needs are satisfied. The who and
what, having already been discussed, we can see that the how may be
classified into three main areas of required technologies. These
are:
a. Sensory. This is predominantly in the departments of sight &
sound (e.g. to detect the enemy), touch (e.g. to ascertain reality)
and smell (e.g. to determine toxicity of air).
b. Mechatronics. This entails the delivery systems upon which the
unmanned systems would ride on. It would include technologies such
as propulsion, aerodynamics and robotics.
c. C4. For the human operator to command the unmanned systems,
technologies that need to be mastered include artificial
intelligence, radio-frequency technology and
micro-controllers.
The key to mastering unmanned warfare would include the complex
tasks of cross-selecting the technological components and
integrating them into our military hardware. The selected
components should be seen as capabilities a country's armed forces
and defence industries must master, for they constitute the very
essence of its future fighting capabilities.
Through a systematic and rigorous programme of developing this
unmanned capability, new core competencies would emerge and these
are potential highways to the future for our local defence
industry. Besides providing a country's armed forces with a
military advantage, technologies applied in unmanned systems have
potential for a myriad of commercial payoffs. For instance, car
manufacturers are beginning to explore unmanned driving on highways
for safety as well as time and highway efficiency. Hence, unmanned
technology offers our defence industry an attractive area to
venture into, with additional potential for commercial
payoffs.
CONCLUSION
The employment of unmanned platforms in the battlefield serves not
only to overcome the constraints arising from manpower and resource
shortages, but also increases the operational capability of a
fighting force. They will provide tangible increases in combat
range, firepower, speed, element of surprise, command and control,
etc. As unmanned warfare and the mastery of unmanned technology
will become increasingly important parts of a nation's strategic
architecture, her armed forces and her defence industries will need
to pay appropriate attention to this aspect of warfare.
Note: The writer wishes to thank MAJ Lai Chin Kwang, MAJ Gregory
Loh, CPT Chiang Sin Ann, CPT Hi Cheong Leong, CPT Ho Kok Wei, CPT
Lee Cher Heng, CPT Ngoh Sien Sen, CPT Soh Teck Kwee, CPT Tan Chee
Khiong and CPT Tham Kah Weng for their contributions.
MAJ Tew See Mong is currently in G3-Army. He obtained a BSc (Hons)
from NUS in 1990. MAJ Tew attended the Singapore Command and Staff
College in 1997.
